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CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP:  
BETWEEN NATIONAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS                  
IN POST-WAR KNIN, CROATIA
1 
Izazov građanstvu: Između nacionalnih i socijalnih prava u poratnom 
Kninu, Hrvatska 
APSTRAKT Rad se bavi postsocijalističkim poraćem u području grada Knina u Hrvatskoj. 
Analizira se »veliki plan« hrvatskog nacionalnog inženjeringa nakon rata 1990-ih godina i 
njegov (delimični) »neuspeh« na lokalnom nivou. Koristeći pojmove socijalne sigurnosti i 
građanstva kao analitički okvir, autorka pokazuje da je hrvatska nacionalnost postala ne 
samo  ideološka  perspektiva  nego  i  praktično  sredstvo  ostvarivanja  socijalnih  prava, 
uključujući  i  rešavanje  stambenog  pitanja.  Ova  strategija  se,  međutim,  ispostavila  kao 
kratkovida: mnogi hrvatski naseljenici i povratnici, koji su u Knin došli s entuzijazmom, 
suočili su se s ograničenom dostupnošću socijalnih i materijalnih beneficija u poratnim, 
postsocijalističkim okolnostima, kao i sve manjim efektom nacionalnih prava počev od 1998. 
godine.  Kninsko  područje  je  doživelo  marginalizaciju  i  »demodernizaciju«,  a  brojni 
»nacionalni  pobednici«  pretvorili  su  se  u  društvene  gubitnike.  Rastakanjem  nacionalne 
solidarnosti ljudi u ovom regionu započeli su izgradnju (krhkog) lokalnog društva, što daje 
nadu za pojavu civilnih procesa u budućnosti. 
KLJUČNE REČI nacionalna prava, socijalna prava, Hrvatska, kninsko područje 
 
ABSTRACT The paper deals with the post-war, postsocialist region of Knin in Croatia and 
discusses the 'grand plan' of Croatian national engineering after the war in the 1990s and its 
(partial) 'failure' at the local level. Building on concepts of social security and citizenship as 
an analytical frame, it shows that the Croatian nationality became not only an ideological 
perspective, but a practical means to achieving social rights, including access to housing. 
However,  this  logic  was  rather  shortsighted.  While  many  Croatian  settlers  as  well  as 
Croatian returnees came to Knin with enthusiasm, they became frustrated by the limited 
access  to  social  and  material  benefits  in  the  post-war,  postsocialist  situation  and  the 
diminishing power of national rights from 1998 on. The region of Knin became marginalised 
———— 
1 This article builds on my book “Claiming ownership in post-war Croatia” (2006), for which I have 
done fieldwork in the region of Knin in 2000 and 2001 (funded by the Max Planck Institute for 
Social Anthropology, Halle) as well as on the article “Croatia’s Serbs Ten Years after the End of the 
War” (2007). I am very grateful to Ivana Spasić and the two anonymous reviewers for their critical 
comments. 372  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. L (2008), N° 4 
and  'de-modernised'  and  many  'national  winners'  became  social  losers.  With  the 
fragmentation  of  national  solidarity,  people  in  the  Knin  region  started  to  construct  a 
(fragile) local society, giving hope for the emergence of civil processes. 
KEY WORDS national rights, social rights, Croatia, Knin region 
Introduction 
Postsocialism in Croatia meant independence from the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia – but this came at a high price. An interethnic war broke out between 
Serbs and Croats in 1991 and lasted for four years. The region of Knin formed one 
of the centres of this conflict. Using this region as a case study, in this paper I want 
to grasp what kind of transformation was on the way in Croatia after the end of war 
and partly is even today, especially in the former war regions. In order to understand 
the  transformation  I  want  to  look  at  changing  notions  of  social  security  and 
citizenship rights from two perspectives: firstly the political and legal changes as 
well as their (partly difficult) implementation, and secondly from the viewpoints of 
the inhabitants of Knin, and especially the Croatian settlers, after the end of war in 
1995.  A  special  focus  will  be  put  on  the  transformation  of  housing  rights  and 
practices, as housing is one of the fundamental aspects of social security and can be 
seen as a basic human right. 
I will argue that during the war and also in the immediate post-war period, 
citizenship rights, including the right to housing, were mainly defined nationally. 
Croatian nationality became not only in ideological perspective a means to achieve 
rights, but also on the level of practices as in access to housing. Many Croatian 
settlers  as  well  as  Croatian  returnees  came  to  Knin  with  enthusiasm,  feeling 
protected by the Croatian state and hoping to build up a new future as promised by 
the Croatian authorities. However, this view was shaken when realising that in the 
post-war,  post-socialist  situation,  the  region  of  Knin  became  increasingly 
marginalised and “de-modernised” and social rights – like the right to employment 
and housing which had been guaranteed during socialism – had diminished. Croatian 
settlers as well as Croatian returnees started to realise that they were not “national 
winners” but social losers. 
In order to understand the transformation in Knin, I will distinguish three time 
frames  –  the  period  of  1990-1999,  2000-2003,  and  from  2003  on.  First  of  all, 
however, I want to introduce some theoretical thoughts on the conceptualization of 
the  postwar-,  postsocialist  transformation,  as  well  as  on  changing  notions  of 
citizenship and social security. 
Theoretical considerations as frames of interpretation 
According to Brandtstädter (2007: 27), most academics and non-academics 
believe that the postsocialist transition is a phase which is perceived as being “in-Carolin Leutloff-Grandits: Contested citizenship: Between national and social rights…  373 
between” a socialist past and a capitalist future, which in Europe is often associated 
with “the West”, to which these societies are moving forward. The transformation is 
seen from the fixed ideological vision that this future will be better, more prosperous 
and more modern, while they see their socialist past often as a form of stagnation 
and retreat. In this fashion, also from many leading politicians, radical attempts of 
social  engineering  are  going  on,  in  order  to  create  a  new  social,  political  and 
economic  order.  These  radical  attempts  Brandtstädter  calls  “grand  plans”.  Her 
argument is however that these “grand plans” often also fail, not least because of 
their high ideologization and distance to reality. According to Brandtstädter, many 
people  who  live  in  the  postsocialist  transformation,  especially  whose  in  newly 
marginalized zones, have to cope with an imperfect present in which partly even 
basic  social  security  is  far  from  given.  Although  the  violent  post-socialist 
transformations in former Yugoslavia have been often treated as something different 
from the rest of post-socialist transitions due to the extreme forms of nationalism 
followed by outbreak of war and ethnic cleansing, nationalism promised a better 
future to all those people belonging to one’s own nation and can therefore also be 
seen  as  a  “grand  plan”  of  modernisation.  This  holds  true  although  this  kind  of 
transformation led to an even greater marginalization of certain areas compared to 
other post-socialist transformations, and left many people with disappointed hopes. 
Generally, the concept of citizenship can be seen as part of the “grand plan” 
of  radical  social  engineering  as  it  changes  with  changing  ideological  frames. 
Focussing on the ideological and practical differences of socialist and postsocialist 
citizenship concepts, Chris Hann (1996), who has done extensive field research in 
Hungary, China, Poland and Turkey, highlights that in Hungary the socialist concept 
of citizenship did not entail many civil and political rights, as for example the right 
to voting and free expression. Still it granted various social and economic rights, 
including free health care, education, a locally based and secure work place, and 
significant social improvements like the building of roads, cultural centres and so on 
in the community. It was meant to diminish the social differences built up during the 
early period of capitalism in Hungary (lasting up the end of WWII). In the post-
socialist Hungary, the new citizenship concept was formulated in opposition to the 
socialist  one.  Political  and  civil  rights  gained  stronger  importance,  and  villagers 
could vote freely and could found associations. At the same time however, the social 
and economic dimensions of citizenship diminished. As a result, many inhabitants 
lost  their  local  work  place,  partly  also  their  health  insurance  and  lived  in 
considerable social insecurity. Social inequalities increased again. Regarding Croatia 
in the 1990s, it is questionable what happened after citizenship rights were largely 
reformulated nationally and social rights were (at least partly) subordinated to the 
national principle. 
The  third  concept  which  will  be  discussed  in  this  paper  is  that  of  social 
security. It addresses not only the material conditions under which people live, like 
the quantity and quality of resources available to them (housing, food, health care, or 
education),  but  goes  beyond  this  concept  and  includes  also  social  relations  like 
feelings of trust and (national) solidarity. Keebet and Franz von Benda-Beckmann 
(2001),  who  also  focus  their  research  on  periods  of  political  and  social 374  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. L (2008), N° 4 
transformation,  plea  to  deal  with  the  actual  social  and  economic  conditions  of 
insecurity of local people and the ways in which social actors interpret, manipulate 
and change social relations and the normative frameworks that pertain to them. In 
this  way,  social  security  is  treated  as  a  dynamic  concept  which  allows  us  to 
understand how social security links the present with the past and the future –– and 
therefore depends on time and space and the point of view of the person dealing with 
it. With such concepts in mind, let us at this point turn to political and legal changes 
since the 1990s and the perspectives of the inhabitants of Knin. 
1990-2000: The politics of ethno-national engineering and the manifestation of 
national rights 
Up  to  1991,  the  region  of  Knin  had  a  mixed  Serb  and  Croat  population. 
Unlike many parts of Croatia, the Serbian population here was in the majority, and 
when Croatia pushed for independence in 1990 some extremist Serbs in the Knin 
region  stirred  up  a  revolt  against  the  newly  elected  Croatian  government.  The 
reasons for this Serbian secession are complex and largely based on an escalating 
and dominant Serbian policy led by Milošević in Belgrade. However, one reason 
which  many  Croatian  Serbs  highlight  is  the  fact  that  after  the  nationalist  HDZ 
(Hrvatska  demokratska  zajednica),  led  by  Franjo  Tuđman,  had  won  the  1990 
elections in Croatia, it aimed at an independent, democratic Croatia, in which the 
position  of the Serbs would be redefined. The Serbs, who at that time  made up 
12.2%  of  the  population  of  Croatia  (Goldstein  2003:  468),  and  up  to  this  time 
enjoyed the same political status as a “state people” as the Croats, were supposed to 
be assigned the status of a “minority”, and  many Serbs at least feared that their 
rights would be diminished with that. I will not go into more detail into the reasons 
of war, but it is arguable that the changes in citizenship rights really had an impact in 
the war escalation. As will be outlined later on, access to housing and employment 
as two important elements of citizenship rights were transformed during the war and 
the post-war period on a national basis, and remained an important barrier for ethnic 
reconciliation and return of Serbs. 
Beginning in April 1991, after several violent incidents in ethnically mixed 
regions of Croatia, the conflict developed into a territorial  war (cf. Grandits and 
Leutloff-Grandits  2003:  23-45  and  Sundhaussen  1994).  With  the  support  of  the 
Yugoslav People’s  Army (JNA), Serb paramilitaries  brought  even  more areas of 
Croatia  under  their  control,  and  started  with  the  first  ‘ethnic  cleansing’.  At  the 
climax of the refugee crisis at the  end of 1991, the UNHCR counted  more than 
600,000 persons who had been expelled from their homes in Croatia or who had 
taken flight; most of this number were Croats (International Crisis Group 2002: 3). 
In the Serb-occupied areas, massive amounts of Croatian property were destroyed. 
Serbs from other parts of Croatia, in which they formed a local minority,
2 emigrated 
———— 
2 Actually, at the start of the war, only 61% of Croatia’s Serbs lived in the regions of Knin, Kordun, 
Banija, and Slavonia, which later was largely absorbed into the ‘Republic of Serb Krajina’ (cf. 
Sundhaussen 2001: 19-35). Carolin Leutloff-Grandits: Contested citizenship: Between national and social rights…  375 
on  grounds  of  ethnic  discrimination  and  infringements  of  their  rights.  They  fled 
either  to  Serbia  or  to  Serb-occupied  areas  of  Croatia.  This  resulted  in  largely 
‘ethnically clean’ territories on both sides of the boundary. 
In 1995, the Croatian army regained the Serb-held territory in two military 
operations  called  Bljesak  (‘Flash’)  and  Oluja  (‘Storm’).  The  military  offensives 
prompted the flight of almost the entire Serb civilian population of the so-called 
Serbian Krajina, consisting of more than 150.000 persons,
3 to the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and the regions of Bosnia under Serb control. Only about 5,000 to 
6,000  Serb  civilians  –  predominantly  those  of  advanced  age  –  remained  in  the 
Krajina (Goldstein, 2003: 420). That Serbs, who had tried, in spite of Oluja, to stay 
in  their  homeland,  were  acutely  threatened  was  validated  through  the  casualties 
during and after the military operation. According to reports in the Croatian daily 
newspaper, Vjesnik, in 2003, some 601 civilians were killed or went missing in the 
first 100 days after Oluja; most of them were of advanced age. Between August 
1995  and  the  end  of  1996,  about  73%  of  Serb-owned  houses  were  partly  or 
completely destroyed, along with public buildings and factories. The proportion of 
Serb houses which were plundered has been estimated even higher (Otvoreni Oci 
1998: 9). 
Violence against Serb civilians and the  destruction  of their property  were, 
however,  not  the  only  phenomena  which  defined  the  time  after  Oluja.  Almost 
simultaneously, a huge wave of returning refugees and also immigrants began to 
arrive. According to a statement of the International Crisis Group (issued in 2002), 
there were still about 220,000 persons, mainly ethnic Croats, who had been driven 
out of Serb-occupied areas of Croatia and were still waiting to return. In the first 
days and months after Oluja, a large part of them came back. By 2004, some 95% of 
them had been registered as “returned” (Global IDP Database 2004; International 
Crisis  Group  2002:3;  IDMC  2006:  4).  Nevertheless,  this  high  figure  should  be 
treated with caution. Often the registered returnees did not actually settle down or 
moved  elsewhere  after  a  time.  In  addition,  at  least  20,000  abandoned  (and 
plundered) houses which had belonged to Serbs were turned over to Croatian settlers 
for their use. Moreover, up to 30,000 domiciles (some of which had lain outside the 
war zone), which had been classified as “socially owned property” in socialist times 
but  in  which  Serbs  had  acquired  rights  of  usufruct,  were  turned  over  to  Croats 
(Vreme 4 August 2005:13, IDMC 2006: 6). 
The category of socially owned property was unique to socialist Yugoslavia 
and existed alongside private and state-owned property. In fact, all over socialist 
Yugoslavia, the right to housing was next to the right to education, health care and 
employment one of the social entitlements formulated by the socialist state to which 
all citizens were entitled. Unlike the capitalist system, where people need enough 
money to buy a house or a guarantee to be eligible for a loan, in socialist Yugoslavia 
socially owned housing was bound to the work place and ‘social’ and ‘political’ 
criteria  proved  to  be  the  most  decisive  determinants  to  receive  housing  rights. 
———— 
3  Compare  Helsinki  Committee  in:  B92  specijal:  10  godina  nakon  Oluje  nad  Krajinom.  HHO  – 
posledice „Oluje“, 7. August 2005. 376  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. L (2008), N° 4 
According to the socialist ideology, apartments and loans for houses were supposed 
to be allocated to workers and their families based on a distribution scheme that took 
account of their years in employment (radni staž), their payments into the housing 
fund  of  the  firm  they  worked  in,  their  family  and  property  status,  the  family’s 
housing situation, and, of course, political criteria such as membership in the League 
of  Communists  of  Yugoslavia  (the  former  Communist  Party  of  Yugoslavia)  or 
commitment  to  the  Partisans  during  WWII  (cf.  Nord  1992:  292).  From  the 
ideological point of view, the distribution of housing property therefore followed the 
notion of supporting the weak in society and creating social justice and became a 
matter  of  socialist  citizenship  rights  (cf.  Benda-Beckmann  2001).  In  practice, 
however, the ideology was not always put into place and social differences between 
the socialist elites and the (lower strata of the) population remained valid or even 
widened. 
Contrary  to  this,  the  post-socialist,  post-war  period  in  Croatia  was 
characterised by two quite different transformations concerning access to property 
and  citizenship  rights:  first  of  all  the  privatisation  of  formerly  socially  owned 
property  and  secondly  the  distribution  of  housing  property  along  national  lines. 
Concerning  the  privatization  of  formerly  socially  owned  property  in  the  post-
socialist  transformation  period,  the  new  constitution  of  1991  had  dissolved  the 
category of socially owned property and had placed it under state administration. 
Property could be transformed into private property as soon as it had been occupied 
by  the  tenant  for  several  years  and  after  the  payment  of  a  relatively  small  and 
subsidised sum, i.e. a price below the market value. The privatisation of formerly 
socially owned housing was one element of the ‘grand plan’ of social transformation 
in post-socialist Croatia (see Bezovan 2005), as well as in all other former Yugoslav 
republics. In Croatia, the possibility to turn the former socially owned housing into 
private property was however mainly given to ethnic Croats, while Serbs who had 
fled their socially owned apartments lost their rights to reclaim them. 
But also  many Croats did not  manage to achieve private  housing property 
after the demise of socialism and the abolition of socially owned housing. As rents 
on private apartments tended to be very high in the Yugoslav successor states as 
well  as  in  many  other  post-socialist  states,  housing  became  a  burning  social 
question. The Croatian state made some efforts to deal with this problem by granting 
poor  Croat  citizens  access  to  housing  property  of  Serbs  who  fled  the  county.  It 
therefore linked social rights to nationalist criteria and policies (cf. Bezovan 2005). 
In fact, the distribution of abandoned Serb property after the end of the war 
followed  first  of  all  national  criteria.  This  was  given  legal  sanction  through  the 
passage of new laws on property rights.
4 The ‘Law on areas of special state concern’ 
was central in this respect. It was released in order to ‘mitigate the consequences of 
war’, to ‘ease the rapid return of Croats who were expelled between 1993 and 1995’, 
as well as to ‘facilitate the settlement of Croats’ in the former Serb-occupied regions 
———— 
4 See „Law on Temporary Take-over and Administration of Specified Property” and “Law on Lease of 
Apartments in  Liberated Areas (1995)”.  See also  Human  Rights Watch. Publications:  Tenancy 
Rights; and International Crisis Group, 2002: 6. Carolin Leutloff-Grandits: Contested citizenship: Between national and social rights…  377 
and  to  encourage  the  “Croatian  settlers  and  returnees  from  abroad;  Croats  from 
Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who decided of their own free will 
to  settle  in  Croatia”.  The  law  also  stipulated  that  the  settlers  would  be  granted 
property rights for the  housing space after a period of 10 years of uninterrupted 
settlement and use of the property, and therewith making the settlement durable. At 
the same time, the Croatian state integrated a social component under the heading of 
these  national  dimensions.  The  ‘Law  on  areas  of  special  state  concern’  which 
encouraged the settlement of Croats into abandoned (Serbian) (private as well as 
former  socially  owned)  housing  space  for  example  encouraged  the  settlement  of 
“unemployed citizens or citizens who needed to solve their housing situation”. In 
addition, the Croatian settlers were promised employment and other economic and 
social benefits and privileges – privileges, which had been existed partly also during 
socialism, but which had been generally open to all ethnic groups.
5 The Croatian 
state thus responded to the burning social questions which affected also many Croats 
after the demise of socialism and the abolition of socially owned housing, and in this 
way  fuelled  nationalistic  thoughts  and  feelings  among  the  lower  strata  of  Croat 
ethnicity. 
The new housing rights and the ensuing settlement in the Krajina of many 
young Croatian families, who took over abandoned Serb houses and apartments, led 
to another revision of the ethnic structure of the population and slowed down the 
return of many Serbs. Of the more than 300,000 Serbs who, at the end of the war, 
had either fled Croatia or sought protection at the time in eastern Slavonia, which 
was still under Serbian control (International Crisis Group 2002: 3), only little more 
than one third came back by 2006 (IDMC 2006). Furthermore, according to reports 
of diverse international organisations, up to 60 percent of these returnees merely 
allow themselves to be registered formally but do not, in fact, live permanently in 
Croatia. Most of the real returnees are older people (IDMC 2006: 4).
6 
 The Croatian version of hope: Local consequences of the ethno-national policy of 
the Croatian state  
In accordance with the law inviting different groups of ‘Croats’ to move to the 
former war zone, Croatian settlers in the region of Knin came from various regions 
in Croatia itself, from Vojvodina and even Kosovo, the then southern province of 
Serbia. They occupied both – private property of Serbs as well as former socially 
owned property which had been allocated to Serbs under socialism. The majority of 
the  settlers,  however,  came  from  different  parts  of  Bosnia,  such  as  the  regions 
———— 
5 This is however also rather the ideological view as well as mirroring the official procedures. In 
practice the distribution of housing and other privileges followed partly also clientelistic structures. 
6 According to an investigation of the UNHCR carried out by the Public Opinion Research Institute 
PULS (2001: 13), the average age of Serbian returnees in the former war zones in Croatia was 
exactly 60 years (in 2001). Only 8.9% of those of age were between 18 and 39, 27.2% were 
between 40 and 59 years of age, and 62.1% belonged to the over 60 group. 378  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. L (2008), N° 4 
around Zenica, Tuzla and Vareš, mostly ethnically mixed areas where Croats had 
been in the minority before (and after) the war. 
Settlers coming originally from other parts of Croatia often had no property of 
their  own,  were  often  unemployed  and/or  unable  to  find  the  money  to  rent  an 
apartment. At the same time, social entitlements like housing and jobs had been cut, 
with  no  social  net  founded  on  civil  rights  to  catch  and  support  the  truly  needy. 
Magdalena, a woman in her late twenties and the mother of a young girl, explained 
why she had moved from Zagreb: “I had to rent a flat privately, I was a sub-tenant. 
I did not have a house, or a flat, I had nothing. I would not have come here if I had 
had something.” Like Magdelena,  many settlers  hoped to use  nationally  defined 
access rights to property in order to escape their difficult social circumstances. 
These considerations are also valid when considering the settlement of Croats 
from Bosnia, but the situation here was more complex. Nearly all of the settlers from 
Bosnia had been  expelled from their homes  during the  war and  many  were also 
victims of violence. Whether people had owned property in Bosnia or not, most had 
no wish to return. Although many had positive memories of their pre-war lives, they 
felt that such memories belonged to a past that could not be rebuilt – their home 
community had been destroyed and they were homeless. They were bitter that the 
war had turned them into a suppressed and discriminated national minority in their 
native regions in Bosnia. They argued not to be able to express their own thoughts, 
to speak their Croatian language (although the language is, from a linguistic point of 
view, quite the same as Serbian or Bosnian), and to practise their religion in their 
home regions in Bosnia – a process of marginalisation of national minorities as well 
as  of  national  homogenisation  that  according  to  some  settlers  had  started  under 
socialism,  reaching  critical  point  during  the  war  and  continuing  well  into  the 
postwar  period.  The  process  of  occupying  houses  belonging  to  members  of  the 
national minority by members of the national majority was an important element in 
this development. In Croatia, it made the return of Serbs very difficult. The fact that 
the  “new”  Croatian  citizenship  law,  which  was  based  on  an  ethnic  principle, 
extended the right to Croatian citizenship virtually automatically to ethnic Croats in 
Bosnia (and other countries of the world), made it possible that Croatian refugees 
from  Bosnia  easily  became  citizens  of  Croatia  and  received  housing  based  on 
“national considerations”. Croatian settlers felt safe through the notion of a Croatian 
solidarity, and had hopes for a better future within the Croatian nation state. At this 
moment, they believed in the ‘grand plan’ of national transformation by the Croatian 
state (disregarding the fact that they came to a region which was in many cases even 
more marginalized than the one they had lived in during socialism). 
On account of this, most settlers in the war-torn region declared themselves to 
be ethnic Croats. Many settlers from Bosnia had acquired Croatian citizenship only 
recently,  in  order  to  validate  their  settlement.
7  They  assumed  that  the  area  was 
———— 
7  Of  approximately  140,000  refugees  from  Bosnia  in  Croatia,  120,000  have  received  Croatian 
citizenship up to 2001 and therefore no longer have refugee status. They are seen as ‘settlers’. 
However, many have kept their Bosnian citizenship. Around 20,000 refugees from Bosnia still have 
refugee status in Croatia (MPWRC 2001). Carolin Leutloff-Grandits: Contested citizenship: Between national and social rights…  379 
waiting to be settled by ethnic Croats. At the same time, they were unable to throw 
off the uncomfortable feeling of being newcomers. A man in his mid-40s from the 
region of Sarajevo expressed it this way: 
“I think that we as well as all other citizens are needed in these regions, that 
is,  in  our  beautiful  homeland  that  I  consider  my  homeland,  my  motherland  of 
Croatia, and I have deep hopes that we will stay here, that we will not have to move 
on ... I believe my state and trust that it will support me. I want to be as trustworthy 
and honourable as I can. I want to stay here, because I fought in the war for Croatia. 
I fought trustworthily and honourably and I do not feel ashamed of that today. I do 
not feel ashamed of our flag.” 
Such declarations indicate the insecurity felt by many Croatian settlers from 
Bosnia about settling in Knin and their need to justify their status. Many settlers also 
‘marked’  the  houses  they  occupied  with  graffiti  showing  the  words  ‘zauzeto’ 
(occupied) and ‘Hrvat’ (Croat) and hung a Croatian flag from their house, or painted 
the Croatian coat of arms and  other Croatian symbols (such as acronyms  of the 
Croatian  Democratic  Union)  on  the  outer  walls.  These  symbols  and  slogans 
demonstrated their belonging to the Croatian nation and thus were an attempt to 
stamp their claim to the house and to justify their settlement in the area. In this way, 
there was a shift from the importance of individual citizen rights to the importance 
of  national  group rights, which  was accompanied by an uprooting  of the people 
through war and migration. 
Most local Croats were  euphoric  of coming  home after the  end  of  war in 
1995, and many also adopted a national view of their home and homeland. After 
having suffered from Serbian secession and having been expelled by Serbs from 
their houses and region, they felt that home was a secure place only as long as it 
remained  “Croatian”.  But  especially  the  better  educated  and  the  young  ones 
preferred to stay in the towns of the coast and the capital Zagreb in which they had 
found employment or had started an education, instead of returning to a war-torn 
region. The complete destruction of communal and social life and the wounds of war 
visible in the locality of Knin diminished the value of coming home. 
Furthermore,  in  contrast  to  the  newly  incoming  Croats  who  occupied  the 
private  family  houses  of  Serbs,  returning  local  Croats  had  much  stronger  moral 
concerns  about  occupying  private  Serbian  property.  In  conversation,  they  often 
underlined the fact that they would respect private property and would not seek to 
live in the property of others, as Croatian settlers did. A 35-year-old Croatian man 
from Biskupija who had been a soldier during war and took part in Oluja in 1995 
was adamant on this point: “No one can take the home of someone else, we are clear 
about this”. In their  view, the social status of a family  was partly bound to the 
private  family  house  they  had  built  during  socialism,  and  by  not  respecting  the 
private  property  of  others,  they  feared  that  Croatian  settlers  got  the  social 
organisation of their home region into a mess. In this way, they held on to a social 
order  that  derived  from  socialism,  and  had  concerns  that  Croatian  settlers 
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Interestingly,  this  did  not  apply  to  abandoned  (former)  socially  owned 
housing property, which younger local Croats without housing property started to 
occupy,  too.  The  distinction  between  private  and  socially  owned  property  was 
mainly connected to the feeling of having been discriminated against and ruled by 
Serbs during the socialist period and especially during the war in the 1990s. This 
was regarded as particularly true in relation to the apartments that had belonged to 
the Yugoslav army in socialist times and had been used by the Serbian Krajina army 
during the war in the 1990s. Occupation of these apartments was seen as legitimate 
because the Serbs who were ‘aggressors in the war against Croatia’ had forfeited 
their rights to them. The fact that many other former socially owned apartments, 
which had been built by various firms and factories in Knin, were occupied by local 
Croats was justified by arguing that Serbs had been overprivileged in the socialist 
system and had received easier access to flats. The gap between legal norms and 
ideology  on  the  one  hand  and  the  practices  of  property  distribution  during  the 
socialist system on the other led to the creation of new norms which built on the idea 
of  correcting  perceived  historical  injustices.  In  this  way,  the  nationalist  property 
regime of the transition period was not completely new to people in Knin, but was a 
reassertion of  norms and practices known  from the  socialist  era – and therewith 
genuinely “post-socialist” as formulated by Humphrey (2001). 
 Shifting power frames and shifting rights: 2000 to 2003 
The  transfer  of  Serb  housing  and  the  housing  rights  which  the  Serbs  had 
enjoyed  in  socialism,  to  Croats  was  one  of  the  central  manifestations  of 
discrimination  against  Serbs  at  different  levels  in  Croatia  after  independence. 
However, from 1998 on, the concept of nationally based citizenship rights which 
granted ethnic Croats social rights like housing was increasingly restricted. 
After the flight of the Serb civilian population from the former war zones and 
the  destruction  and  confiscation  of  their  houses,  international  organisations,  and 
especially the UNTAES (which was dissolved by the OSCE in 1997), the UNHCR, 
and the EU exerted increased pressure on the Croatian government in this question. 
They argued that the right of return was guaranteed to all refugees by the Dayton 
Peace Accords. Moreover, they emphasised that the protection of private property 
had  been  confirmed  in  the  Croatian  constitution.  They  threatened  Croatia  with 
international  isolation,  in  the  event  that  these  rights  were  not  respected  (OSCE, 
Status Report No. 13: 4). 
In 1998, international pressure resulted in the launching of a return program 
by  the  Croatian  government,  which  revoked  sections  of  the  nationalistically 
motivated  housing  laws  of  1996/97  and  included  the  establishment  of  new 
administrative procedures for resolving disputes between the Croatian settlers and 
the  Serb  property-owners.  To  that  end,  housing  commissions  were  set  up  in  all 
communities  in  which  there  were  property  disputes,  so  that  they  might  serve  as 
mediators  and  find  measures  to  facilitate  the  return  of  property  to  the  Serbian 
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pravni promet i posredovanje nekretninama), which was established in 1997, was 
supposed to facilitate the sale of the property of those Serbs not wishing to return at 
suitable prices (this  was all the  more  necessary because, at that time, there  was 
hardly any private  market in  housing). For another thing,  it  was the task  of the 
agency to  make alternative  housing available to Croats occupying the  houses  of 
Serbs, from the pool of acquired houses (Deutschlander and Roggia, 1998: 25). The 
program did not, however, foresee the restitution of residential rights for those who 
had  been  living  in  formerly  socially  owned  housing.  Since  this  had  been  the 
predominant system in the cities, returns to urban areas were, in this way, obstructed 
to a considerable extent. 
Also, until his death at the end of 1999, Croatia’s autocratic president, Franjo 
Tuđman, and for that matter also the HDZ which he led, showed little enthusiasm 
for  the  implementation  of  the  refugee  return  program.  In  particular,  the  planned 
return of houses encountered resistance. Many housing commissions accepted the 
applications of Serbs for the return  of their property, to be sure, but did  not do 
anything more about it. Other housing commissions, by contrast, annulled the rights 
of  usufruct  which  had  been  bestowed  on  Croats,  but  did  not  offer  the  Croatian 
settlers  any  alternative  dwellings,  so  that  these  questionably  occupied  residences 
were not vacated. This was also due to the fact that the state agency for the transfer 
and  mediation  of  property  did  not  make  available  any  such  alternative  lodging 
possibilities.  Illegally  occupied  houses  were  not  vacated,  especially  as  generally 
there were no court orders calling for them to be vacated (Human Rights Watch 
2003: 17). Therefore, the return of Serb refugees got under way very slowly in 1998. 
In 2000, Croatian settlers occupying Serbian housing units still made up the large 
majority in Knin, outnumbering local Croatian as well as Serbian returnees, and only 
the rural villages, which were less attractive to Croatian settlers, were again mainly 
inhabited by returning Serbs. 
The stark discrepancy between the stated goals of the refugee return program 
and their realisation was due especially to the lack of political will on the part of 
Croatian power-brokers at both the local and the national level, whose interests by 
no means coincided with those of international organizations. The HDZ, which had 
an especially strong base among (Croatian) returnees and new settlers in the former 
war zones, relied on  nationalistic arguments and talk  of the “glorious Homeland 
War” to build their constituency, and did not want to give affront to their adherents 
with  a  “Serb-friendly”  policy.  In  order  not  to  lose  their  power  base,  they  were 
prepared to accept even Croatia’s international isolation, especially where the EU 
was  concerned.  As  a  result,  until  2000,  the  European  Commission  was  only 
represented in Croatia through a single official legate. 
The international isolation and the bad economic situation, which was in part 
associated with it, hit citizens of Croatia hard toward the end of the 1990s. With 
Tuđman’s death in December 1999, this led to a political changeover at the next 
parliamentary and presidential elections. At the beginning of 2000, a coalition of 
former  opposition  parties,  under  the  leadership  of  the  post-communist  Social 
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regime intensified Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY and released a new action 
plan  for  the  return  of  the  Serbs.  The  latter  concentrated  once  again  on  the 
reoccupation of houses. The lack of alternative dwelling space was, in particular, 
taken  into  consideration.  At  the  same  time,  the  authorities  promised  to  take  a 
tougher line where illegal house-squatting was concerned. 
However, in many regards, the new governmental policy did not actually get 
anywhere. The readiness to make greater efforts to satisfy EU demands was based 
on the expectation that the new regime would work hard toward improving relations 
with the EU and, in tow, achieving membership in the European Union early. But at 
the same time, the SDP regime hesitated to put the question of the return of Serbs 
too much in the foreground, out of worry that this would polarise Croatian society. 
The veterans’ association, local politicians in the former war zones, and in part also 
representatives of Catholic institutions also severely criticised the policy vis-à-vis 
Serbs and the policy of co-operation with The Hague alike, calling these policies 
unpatriotic.  Their  strong  public  presence  placed  the  regime  under  considerable 
pressure (Goldstein 2003: 441). As a result, the new laws and procedures for the 
return of houses to their Serbian owners were not or only partly applied. Only with 
an internationally funded reconstruction of war damaged homes could the return of 
Serbs be accelerated. 
Fragmentation and radicalisation of hope: Local reactions to the 2000 changes 
In the Knin as well as in other parts of the former war region, the reactions to 
this new policy were however diverse. Many Croatian settlers, whether occupying 
houses in rural areas or in the town of Knin, felt deprived of the rights they had been 
promised. Their hopes of staying in the house for many decades, and perhaps even 
of being able to pass the house on to their children, were dashed. They furthermore 
stressed that they had invested much work and effort in rebuilding and maintaining 
the houses that had become their homes over the past few years. The 30-year-old 
head of a settler family, who in 1997 had moved into a Serbian house in Biskupija 
that had been devastated in 1995 and had been empty for two years, commented on 
the return of the Serbs and their wish to repossess their property in the following 
way: 
Now Serbs are returning. It is normal that people return to their homes. This 
is normal, nothing new, only that it makes the catastrophe here in Knin even bigger 
... You settle the house for them. In fact, you clean up the house and repair it and 
make it habitable again. This house was damaged and we had to repair it before we 
could move in. The windows  were all broken, the whole house had been empty. 
When they return, they will find a house that we settled and rebuilt. 
Like in this example, many settlers were desperately disappointed to learn that 
they were set to ‘lose’ the house they perceived more and more as their home all 
again. Last but not at least, many settlers lived with the insecurity of not knowing 
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Amid  the  uncertainties  surrounding  the  housing  situation,  many  of  these 
Croatian settlers blamed the Croatian SDP-led government for these changes and 
accused it for treason (and the government was scared of such an accusation). Many 
came to believe that Croatian national solidarity should be reinforced. Those settlers 
who had illegally occupied a house were especially prone to such thinking. Until 
2000 – before the HDZ had lost power at the national level – many of these settlers 
had trusted that the housing commissions and other institutions in the region of Knin 
would not evict them. But when the Croatian SDP-led government began to publicly 
propagate the view that private property rights would now be respected and that 
illegal occupants would have to move out of Serbian property, this trust was shaken. 
Those Croats who had illegally occupied property became most dependent on the 
nationalist power-holders acting on local level who supported their property rights 
against  Serbs.  These  settlers  protested  against  the  new  legal  provisions  for  the 
restitution of housing property to Serbian owners and hoped that a re-nationalisation 
of society would strengthen their rights. 
However, this view was not shared by all Croatian settlers. Settlers who had 
originally been holding a use-permit accepted more easily that they would have to 
return the house they occupied to the legal owner, as the government promised them 
not to evict them until they were offered equivalent alternative accommodation. In 
the  municipality  of Biskupija, this confidence  was supported by the  head  of the 
housing commission, a local Croat. He personally delivered the letters informing 
settlers about the cancellation of their use permits, explaining that the settlers could 
stay  in  the  houses  they  occupied  until  the  municipality  offered  them  alternative 
housing. This form of negotiation served to relax tensions between the settlers and 
the Serb  owners. Indeed,  from 2000,  many  of the settlers welcomed the  owners 
when they approached, inviting them in for a cup of coffee and showing them the 
interior of the house. A woman aged about 40, who came to Biskupija from a village 
in the Bosnian municipality of Konjic, explained why she did not worry about the 
return of the Serb owner of the house she was living in: 
The owner once came to speak with us. He had received a decision that the 
house would be returned to him. This will happen as soon as the municipality of 
Knin builds us a house for our nine family members, because we have seven kids 
and with us two parents we are nine. As soon as we get such a house, we will return 
this house, and we will move out. But we do not know when this will happen because 
the municipality doesn’t have any money, and we are their citizens and they can not 
tear us out of the house. 
Relaxed attitudes such as these were based on sound reasoning. By referring 
to  housing  as  a  basic  citizen  right  in  Croatia,  this  settler  expressed  feelings  of 
security which enabled them to accept the return of Serbs and the granting of their 
property rights. In this way, there was a shift in the way that private property of a 
Serb  owner  was  recognised  again.  However,  social  housing  rights  were  still 
connected to the membership of a Croatian ethno-nation which had precedence over 
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barriers,  alternative  accommodation  was  rare  and  most  settlers  had  to  wait  long 
before being able to move into alternative accommodation. 
Insecurity  also  remained  because  of  the  deteriorating  economic  situation. 
During the 1991–5 war, the already weak economic base of the Knin region was 
almost  completely  destroyed.  All  the  region’s  factories,  the  main  source  of 
employment under socialism, suffered looting or devastation. On the heels of the 
war came more general problems that characterised the postsocialist transition, as an 
overall breakdown of the market, with many processing factories and firms going 
out of business and with very high unemployment in the Knin region, rising to more 
than 60% in 2001. As mentioned earlier, the difficult economic situation was also 
another reason why many of the younger and better educated local Croats did not 
return. For Serbs it was even more difficult to get a job in the public sector (about 
the only greater job provider in the Knin region) due to ethnic discrimination, which 
also hindered the return especially of the young ones. 
Given the changes in the  legal, political and  economic conditions in  Knin 
described above, an increasing number of Croatian settlers opted to emigrate again. 
Many of them realised that the nationalist promises to start a new life in the former 
war  regions  did  not  hold  true,  and  that  the  “grand  plan”  to  resettle  the  former 
ethnically mixed regions with ethnic Croats did not consider a strategy to socially 
include these marginalized regions into the Croatian state. 
For those Croatian settlers who found themselves on the bottom of the social 
strata in Croatia, the alternative to move away was however often not given. Their 
situation seemed to become even more problematic, as competition for jobs in the 
public sector increased with the years, especially among local Croats and Croatian 
settlers. In this context, some settlers felt they were always second in line behind the 
local Croats. A settler from the region of Sarajevo put it this way:  “I really wonder, 
it  is  not  clear  to  me,  and  it  doesn’t  make  sense  to  me  ...  are  we  second-class 
citizens? Once we were not second-class citizens but we are now. This is how the 
situation is at the moment”. 
Like  this  settler,  Croatian  settlers  argued  that  they  did  not  deserve  to  be 
treated  as  second-class  citizens  since  they  were  Croats  and  had  fought  for  the 
Croatian state. In response, many settlers started to adopt again a nationalist position 
in order to stress the rights of their own group and to protect themselves from being 
displaced and dispossessed. In 2000, but to a large extent until today, this view was 
supported by influential national organisations, first of all the Catholic Church. The 
Catholic Church increasingly started to address the fate of the Croats of Knin by 
appealing  to  national  solidarity  and  therewith  by  applying  a  national  concept  of 
citizenship rather than a social one. They encouraged Croatian settlers to stay in the 
region and bear their burden through the difficult times they were facing, in order to 
support the Croatian home and ‘homeland’. At this point, social security was mainly 
spiritually (and  nationally) defined, and this spiritual security stood also in stark 
discrepancy with the difficult social and economic perspectives of the settlers in the 
Knin region. It seemed that settlers should forget their daily sorrows in order to live 
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In early 2001, only some months before local elections were held, the local 
Catholic Caritas of Knin launched a welfare campaign which addressed the socio-
economic as well as national problems of the Knin region under the slogans “fight 
the hunger in Knin” and “for survival“ (opstanak). At this time, it tried to give not 
only spiritual but also material support to “hungry Croats” living in Knin. Other 
Catholic institutions responded to the Caritas appeal and expressed their solidarity 
with  the  Croatian  settlers  by  praying  for  the  allegedly  poverty-stricken  Croatian 
families,  by  collecting  donations  and  visiting  Knin  to  preach  to  the  Catholic 
congregation. The bishop of the Šibenik diocese, Ante Ivas, for example supported 
the Croatian settlers in their claims by referring to the “divine” rights of the Croats 
in Knin. He declared: 
God the Father gives His people land and a homeland in which they should 
live freely. So that they will live honourably on their land and in their homeland … 
You have the right to a worthy human life, here in Knin in Croatia. You dear and 
troubled families, dear children and dear young ones. Jesus Christ offers this to you, 
He who is the foundation of every human dignity and human right. You have the 
right  to  a  human  dwelling.  You  have  the  right  to  a  piece  of  land,  to  your  free 
homeland, to your nation, to your language, the right to express yourself and to vote 
… (Glasnik Sv. Ante 2001: 17–19). 
According to the bishop, rights to housing, land, language, free expression 
and a free vote were granted by God. At the same time, he makes clear that in saying 
that God ‘gives his people land’, he is talking of Croats, not Serbs or Muslims. 
Many of the Croatian settlers living in Knin were very positive about the fact 
that the Catholic Church  had finally brought their  miserable  living  conditions to 
public attention. Having felt neglected by the international organisations, which had 
mainly supported Serbs, and ignored by the government and ‘the state’ in general, 
they hoped that the charity campaign would help them to improve their situation. 
The  solidarity  shown  by  other  Croats  and  Catholic  institutions  across  Croatia 
encouraged many Croatian settlers to feel incorporated into the Croatian national 
community and cared for by the Catholic Church, which made them feel secure and 
nourished the hope for a better future. This emotional and spiritual support was for 
many of them even more important than the material help offered by the Church. 
Following  such  political  developments  and  heartful  actions,  in  the  local 
elections held in summer 2001 most citizens of Knin gave an ethnic vote and the 
HDZ  managed  to  stay  in  power.  In  addition,  the  fact  that  Serbs  once  again 
represented a considerable  demographic force, and two Serbian parties had been 
established and took part in the elections, made many Croats worry and rallied them 
behind Croatian national parties. For the Croatian settlers, a further reason to vote 
HDZ was that the party had given them the chance to settle in Croatia after the war, 
and had issued them Croatian travel documents and the right to (temporarily) occupy 
Serbian  homes.  Fearing  they  would  lose  these  rights,  settlers  tended  to  vote  for 
Croatian national parties. The  majority of Serbs, on the other hand, were  deeply 
frustrated with the ‘Croatian’ parties, which had failed to commit themselves fully to 
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Some new reasons to hope, and some to despair: Political changes and 
their local effects from 2003 up to now 
At the governmental elections in November 2003, power changed hands once 
more. The passionate dispute concerning the cost of the war, and also the discontent 
over  the  slowness  with  which  the  economic  situation  was  improving,  negatively 
affected the SDP-led government, and the HDZ once again became the strongest 
party in the parliament. With Ivo Sanader at the helm, who had been the deputy 
foreign minister in the 1990s, the HDZ presented itself however in a reformed way. 
It  seemed  as  if  they  had  given  up  their  “grand  plan”  of  national  engineering  in 
Croatia, or that this plan was at least considered less important than before, and that 
the HDZ was willingly changing in a more civil direction. 
Contrary to the original supposition of the international community, the HDZ 
continued the four-point policy begun by the SDP government, to comply with EU 
demands to improve conditions for the return of Serbs and also in the question of co-
operation  with  the  ICTY.  The  most  powerful  motivation  behind  these  policies 
continued  to  be  the  aspiration  to  be  accepted  into  the  EU  as  soon  as  possible. 
Moreover, instead of making a coalition with the ultra-nationalists, Sanader signed a 
pact  with  the  opposition  SDSS  (Samostalna  demokratska  srpska  stranka,  or 
Independent  Democratic  Serbian  Party),  led  by  Milorad  Pupovac  and  Vojislav 
Stanimirović. The SDSS saw in this pact the chance to share in power in Croatia 
and, in this way, to push for the return of the Serbs (Rozic 2003: 573-574, Grandits 
2004). New governmental plans for the improvement of conditions for the return of 
Serbs  followed.  Again,  they  confronted  above  all  the  question  of  housing  and 
property. 
These new governmental policies had of course also a strong impact on the 
local level – and, perhaps surprisingly, mainly in a positive way. The reformed HDZ 
pressured the local HDZ politicians and the administrations to accept the rights of 
Serbs and to implement the reformed property laws. In this way, on the local level as 
well citizenship rights were increasingly reformulated in terms of individual, private 
and  social  rights  rather  than  in  national  terms.  The  reconstruction  of  destroyed 
houses was finally accelerated,
8 and the return of private residential property was 
implemented. The number of  occupied  houses, which  once stood at 20,000, was 
reduced to 1,400 by November 2004, and further reduced to 32 cases by February 
2006 (IDMC 2006: 5). As this was done largely through the massive creation of 
alternative housing to provide for the Croatian settlers, who in turn were more open 
towards the return of Serbs. Furthermore, thanks to the good example from national 
level politics and thanks to the support of the international organisations, in Knin 
Croats and Serbs – although still organised in different “national” parties, started to 
cooperate and to find housing solutions also for the more difficult cases. In this way, 
———— 
8 While there were still about 80,000 proposals to rebuild houses destroyed in the war, which had not 
been executed as of 2002, by the end of 2004, this number had been reduced to 17,000 (OSCE 
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the solving of the housing question for most citizens in the Knin region, regardless 
of  their  ethnic  status,  created  feelings  of  security  and  thus  contributed  to  the 
improvement of interethnic relations in the Knin region. These are the good news. 
However,  in  the  Knin  region  and  partly  beyond,  there  are  still  also 
problematic trends which continue since the beginning of the violent transformation 
period. Up to today, Serbs never regained their rights for former socially owned 
property and therewith lost a fundamental right which they enjoyed under socialism. 
This  had  far-reaching  consequences:  Since,  as  mentioned,  residential  rights  for 
former  socially  owned  property  in  the  cities  made  up  about  70  percent  of  the 
housing units (IDMC 2006: 6), the return of Serbs to urban centres was thereby, to a 
large extent, blocked, cementing ethnic engineering. Half-hearted efforts to provide 
Serbs  who  were  prepared  to  return  with  alternative  dwellings  remained  without 
result (ICG 2002: 4, 10; OSCE 2003, Status Report No. 13, p. 2; and OSCE 2004, 
Status Report No. 15, IDMC 2006: 6-7). Croats, on the other hand, who kept their 
right  to  use  (and  later  also  to  achieve)  housing  rights  to  former  socially  owned 
property, were content with this procedure and found less reasons to rally against 
Serbs. In this way, the improvement of interethnic relations is also based on the fact 
that Croats increasingly realised that there is no threat from Serbs any more – as up 
to today, most of the returnees were elderly and younger hardly returned for good. 
In fact, the improvement in the situation as regards private residential property 
did not lead, in the case of many younger Serbs, to their lasting return. Due to the 
weak economy in the former war zones,
9 which improved only little in the last years, 
many of them simply locked their doors once again and returned to exile, or tried to 
sell or rent their houses (IDMC 2006: 6-7).
10 Those few who had returned and who 
had hoped that the difficult time would be only a transitional period had increasingly 
lost the hope that the future will be brighter and that they could establish themselves, 
not to speak about achieving the standard of living they have had under socialism. 
But also most Croats, local Croats and settlers alike, are still struck by the 
difficult economic situation and struggle with making a living and becoming self-
reliant. The fact that in the Knin region most settlers belonged to the lower social 
strata even before they moved to the region is no help here. However, the hope dies 
last, and many Croats still prefer to believe in the Catholic Church, the Croatian 
national idea and the nationalist politicians with their promises rather than losing 
any faith in the future. In Knin up to this day nationalist parties have the highest 
ratings. 
———— 
9 For data on economic situation in Knin, see Neue Zürcher Zeitung (3 August 2005), p. 3. For data on 
the general economic situation in the former war zones and especially as regards the discrimination 
against Serbs in the economic sector, see Human Rights Watch, Croatia: Broken Promises, pp. 
53—55; and ICG Balkans Report 2003: 11—12. 
10 In many cases, Serbs were able to sell their houses to the Agency for the Transfer and Mediation of 
Property, which again concluded a rental agreement with the settlers. In other cases, the Serbian 
owners agreed on a rental contract with the Croats living in their houses through the mediation of 
the Croatian Catholic agency, Caritas. In these cases, Caritas was liable for the rent. See OSCE 
Mission to Croatia Headquarters 2004, pp. 2, 3. 388  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. L (2008), N° 4 
Conclusion 
By looking at the war and especially the post-war period through the lens of 
social  transformations,  in  this  paper  I  have  highlighted  the  problematic 
interdependency  of  national  and  social  rights.  The  war  united  the  Croatian  (and 
Serbian) population through the means of national homogenisation and by promising 
social rights and solidarity based on national group-membership. Generally, after the 
end  of  war,  ethnic  engineering  continued,  and  citizenship  rights  were  still 
transformed according to national criteria. This was especially visible in the form of 
access  to  social  security,  including  shelter,  which  were  ideologically  as  well  as 
practically depending on membership in the ‘right’ national group. It hence differed 
fundamentally from the socialist concept of citizenship in former Yugoslavia, but 
also  in  other  socialist  countries  as  for  example  described  by  Chris  Hann  for 
Hungary. Still, when looking at the post-socialist transformations in the realm of 
housing rights, it became also clear that the nationalist procedures of occupation and 
privatisation related to some norms which have been established in socialism, and 
that these binding elements between post-socialist and socialist times created greater 
legitimisation. 
While belonging to the ‘right’ nation was for many Croats associated with 
feelings of security, trust and hope for a better future, in the post-socialist, post-war 
transformation  social  inequalities  increased  also  inside  the  national  group,  and  a 
marginalization of regions took place. Thanks to the settlement program and the 
subordination of social rights to national rights, in the Knin region, many socially 
and economically poor Croatian settler families found themselves in one of the most 
socially and economically marginalized areas of Croatia and became fully dependent 
on the state. In a way, they experienced the divergence between the ideological view 
of this nationalisation project on the one hand and the difficult reality of everyday 
life in the poor regions on the other. Hope began to be scattered. 
When the international community started to pressure the Croatian state to 
adhere to civil rights for Serbs and diminish the national rights of Croats, settlers felt 
disappointed  and  increasingly  insecure.  However,  instead  of  criticising  the 
nationalist concept, many of them reacted with increased nationalism in order to 
hold  on to their perceived rights. This again  was strongly supported by  national 
organisations, first of all the Catholic Church, who appealed to the Croatian national 
solidarity and gave settlers the feeling of spiritual security. For the Catholic Church 
as well as many settlers, hope was at that time still very much bound to the future of 
the Croatian nation state, which stood often in discrepancy with future perspectives 
of the individual settlers which could not make a living in Knin. Other settlers who 
could, moved out of the region again – leaving the poorer ones and the concepts of 
spiritual security offered by the Church behind. 
The interethnic climate in the Knin region started to improve only after the 
link between national rights and social rights was cut by power-holders from above 
and  access  to  housing  was  based  on  private  property  rights  and  social  needs. Carolin Leutloff-Grandits: Contested citizenship: Between national and social rights…  389 
However, the way of criticising the “grand plan” of nationalisation by re-evaluating 
the socialist past, but also the war and the extremes of nationalism, is still far in the 
Knin region. Without an  economic perspective, the formulation  of an alternative 
future is vague for many of its inhabitants. 
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